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GEORGE H . MERRIAM
CRAFT UNIONS VS. INDUSTRIAL UNIONS:
THE 1917 STRIKE AT THE MAINE CENTRAL 
RAILROAD SHOPS IN WATERVILLE, MAINE
In 1917, less than six weeks after the United States declared 
war on Germany, the American Federation of Railroad 
Workers went on strike at Maine Central Railroad’s Waterville 
shops. The Federation was an industrial union, representing 
car workers, carpenters, blacksmiths, boilermakers, inspectors, 
helpers, and laborers. It asked the railroad for four cents an 
hour across-the-board raise for all of its members and union 
recognition. Maine Central Railroad’s management, under­
standably, opposed the demands. But also opposed to the Fed­
eration were the members of two American Federation of Labor 
shop-craft unions: the International Association of Machinists, 
Waterville Lodge no. 285, and the Brotherhood of Railway 
Carmen of America.
Unions like the American Federation of Railroad Workers 
faced a variety of obstacles in the early twentieth century, not 
the least of these being differences within the labor movement 
over basic organizing strategies. Throughout the history of 
American labor, industrial unions — those inclusive organiza­
tions of all workers within an industry — and craft unions — 
representing only select skilled workers in a particular craft — 
demonstrated little mutual sympathy. But the Waterville strike 
is a particularly forceful example of the problems posed by 
these divisions within the labor movement. The strike repres­
ents a classic example of conflict between management and 
labor. But in addition, it illustrates the destructive impact of 
conflict between industrial and craft unionism.
By 1917 Maine Central’s shops had been a major industry 
in Waterville for over sixty-five years. They opened in 1850 after 
the Androscoggin and Kennebec Railroad reached Waterville 
in December 1859, from Danville Junction, fifty-five miles 
away to the southwest, connecting to Portland via the broad 
gauge Atlantic and St. Lawrence Railroad.1 Waterville was an 
ideal location for a railroad center. About ninety miles
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northeast of Portland, Waterville was less than twenty miles 
from the state capital at Augusta. Bangor, a brawling, rapidly 
growing lumber town, lay fifty miles further east. In 1850 
Waterville had a population of 3,964, engaged in many differ­
ent occupations. The town throve on an economic combina­
tion of farming and lumber, with well established scythe and 
axe manufacturing companies, several lumber mills, a plaster 
mill, and the inevitable gristmills. Before the first railroad line 
had reached town, there were already more than one hundred 
and twenty-five skilled tradesmen located there.2 In a dozen 
years, by 1862, Waterville would be the junction point of four 
railroad lines: the Androscoggin and Kennebec; the Portland 
and Kennebec (which ran from Portland along thecoast and up 
the Kennebec to Augusta); the Somerset and Kennebec (passing 
through Waterville on its way north to Skowhegan); and the 
Penobscot and Kennebec (which ran from Waterville to Ban­
gor). As a major junction point, Waterville developed larger 
and larger shops as Maine’s railroad traffic boomed.
The first shops in 1850 had a very small labor force, which 
was composed largely of skilled workers, each of whose overall
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importance to the operation was apparent. The shops em­
ployed a master machinist and two or three other machinists, 
about the same number of carpenters, a painter or two and a few 
laborers.3 No more men were required to service the four origi­
nal locomotives of the Androscoggin and Kennebec Railroad, 
especially since the duties of the locomotive engineer and fire­
man at that time included responsibility for much of what 
today would be called preventive maintenance. Wages in the 
early 1850s were thirty to forty dollars a month for carpenters, 
thirty-five to forty dollars for machinists, and almost exactly 
the same for the chief painter.4 There was some need for tin 
smithing, glazing, and occasional pattern making for castings, 
but the latter work was done by men associated with the 
foundry, and tin sm ithing and glazing were simply done by the 
town's already well established craftsmen. Nearly all of the 
shop men came from Waterville, and most had been born there 
(though not John Philbrick, the master machinist). Indeed, 
most of the shops’ labor force in succeeding decades would 
come from Waterville and its immediate surrounding towns.
One element of Waterville’s population which would 
change was the French-Canadian population, which in 1850 
numbered only 244 people, over half of them young children, 
mostly born in Maine to im migrant parents.5 By 1910 the 
number of French-Canadians in Waterville would be between 
40 and 50 percent of the city’s population, and by 1930 both the 
United States’ census and the local French language news­
paper, the Franco-Americain, would report French-Canadians 
at between 50 and 60 percent of the total population. As late as 
the 1970 census, 30 percent of Waterville’s people claimed 
French as their mother tongue. As a work force for the railroad 
shops, the Franco-Americans would stand apart from the close- 
knit skilled machinists, carpenters, and painters, and it would 
be a long time before the Franco-Americans would reach desir­
able positions in Maine Central’s Waterville shops.6
Maine Central Railroad was formed in 1862 by legally 
recognizing an already existing union (since 1856) of the 
Androscoggin and Kennebec Railroad and the Penobscot and
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Kennebec Railroad.7 From small beginnings the Maine Central 
and its shops grew steadily through the remainder of the cen­
tury. All kinds of maintenance and repair work were done in 
the shops on locomotives, passenger and freight cars, and spe­
cialized rolling stock such as cranes and snow plows. Much of 
the rolling stock was built in the shops, as were several locomo­
tives. The original shops, immediately west of the town's rail­
road stations, grew haphazardly in the center of Waterville. In 
common with similar facilities all over the nation, they became 
outmoded and inadequate by the 1880s as locomotives and 
rolling stock grew heavier and more complicated. The original 
shops were replaced by new and much larger shops in 1887 at a 
location next to the Kennebec River about a mile north of the 
old shops.
By 1886 Maine Central employed 120 men in the old 
shops.8 The new shops opened the next year with a roster of 
250.9 Nearly three hundred were employed by 1898.10 Just 
before the first World War about four hundred were in the work 
force.11 Wages for the machinists, however, did not change 
significantly from 1850 to 1900. Machinists in the first few years 
of shops operation received about forty dollars a m onth for a 
seventy-two hour, six-day week. In 1887 machinists were paid 
just over fifty-three dollars a month, and by 1900 they were 
receiving about sixty dollars a month for a six-day week of ten 
hours a day.12 Such wages were similar to those paid for skilled 
work in other shops across the country.
Machinists were among the “aristocrats of Labor,” a 
group that included engineers, firemen, conductors, carpen­
ters, pattern makers, and steam fitters.13 As such, their wages 
were higher than those in the city’s cotton, woolen, and paper 
mills, all constructed after 1874. Among Waterville’s working- 
class population — the city by 1910 had over 13,000 residents — 
the less skilled jobs were being filled by Franco-Americans, 
particularly in the paper and textile mills, where the work force 
was over fifty percent Franco-American, almost exclusively so 
in some departments.
As the railroad shops expanded, the work force became 
more complex and hierarchical, dividing along lines of skill
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and ethnicity. While the shops hired some French-Canadians, 
mostly for common labor or helper jobs, they still drew most of 
their workers from (‘railroad fam ilies/’ which had sent men 
into railroad work for two or three generations.14 State indus­
trial investigators in 1898 dwelt upon the “American born” 
workers in the shops in their study of Waterville that year, and 
pointed to the native-stock force as an indication of excellence 
in the workmanship. The writer also noted that “the men are 
contented and a strike is never known.”15
Such a claim is underscored by the fact that the las t quarter 
of the nineteenth century was a time of great labor unrest, 
particularly in the nation’s railroad industry. Maine railroad 
workers remained aloof from national trends until after the 
turn of the century. Then, at a time when railroad union 
membership nationwide increased by about 300 percent, the 
Waterville shops saw a fury of union activity.16 Commonly 
unions were organized but were not recognized for years on 
end. This would be the case in Waterville.
On June 9, 1903, shop workers, responding to nationwide 
developments in the labor movement, formed a local of the 
American Federation of Labor’s International Association of 
Car Workers, Pine Tree Lodge, No. 144. The organization grew 
rapidly. In a year its membership rose to 110, including a 
majority of those working in the passenger and freight car 
shops. Initially qualifications for membership were simple; 
prospective members had to be competent car workers and pay 
an initiation fee of $1.00 and monthly dues of $.25. Car workers 
in the union assumed their daily hours of labor to be ten, and 
they expected and received a minimum wage of at least $1.25 a 
day for all members.17 Despite rapid membership growth, the 
Car Workers union won no trade agreement (contract) from 
Maine Central, and in 1905 its leadership altered its organizing 
strategy. Like most turn-of-the-century A.F.L. affiliates, the 
Car Workers refocused their organizing efforts on the shops’ 
most skilled and most strategically im portant workers. Their 
numbers dropped from 110 to 25 as they limited membership to 
car inspectors, engine employees, and those working on air
146
WATERVILLE STRIKE
brakes. At the same time the leadership raised initiation fees to 
$2.00 and demanded a nine hour day and a m inim um  wage of 
$1.90.18
Like the Car Workers, machinists organized in 1904 into 
an exclusive union of twenty-five members and affiliated with 
the International Association of Machinists (A.F.L.) as Water- 
ville Lodge No. 285. They too would be denied a trade agree­
ment for years to come. Their initiation fee was $3.00; dues were 
$.75 a month, and their aims were a nine and a half hour day, 
with a minimum daily wage of $2.25.19
The machinists and the car workers were organized on 
traditional craft-union principles: solidarity only among the 
skilled workers in a relatively narrow field of activity within the 
industry. In 1911, however, the International Association of 
Car Workers withdrew from the American Federation of Labor 
while engaged in a four-year-long shopmens' strike on the 
Illinois Central andU nion Pacific railroads (1911-1915). Three 
years later the car workers merged with a relatively new 
industrial-type union, based in the middle west. There a 
strongly socialistic orientation and a sense of great urgency — a 
resolve to combat more objectionable management policies 
involving premium pay, time study, and skill dilution — 
resulted in a new organizing strategy. This new “Federation of 
Federations" included the American Federation of Railway 
Workers, an industrial rather than a craft union, and when the 
Car Workers merged with the new American Federation of 
Railroad Workers in 1914, the new organization began appeal­
ing for members from all the shop crafts working on United 
States railroads.20 Union membership across the nation was 
soaring — up from 1,907,000 in 1906 to 2,773,000 in 1916 — and 
with the national rate of unemployment dropping steadily to 
less than two percent, it was to be expected that movements 
such as the American Federation of Railroad Workers would 
become active in Maine.21
The failure of the car workers and machinists to gain 
recognition was attributable, at least in part, to the growing 
bargaining power of the Maine Central Railroad. Management
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was no longer simply a local affair. Maine Central had grown 
almost continuously from its beginnings in 1849. Through the 
process of absorbing more than thirty-five small Maine rail­
roads by 1917, it had expanded to almost 1,300 miles of track, 
running through Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont as 
well as ten miles into New Brunswick and sixty miles into 
Quebec.22 Although far smaller than the great national railroad 
systems, Maine Central’s pattern of consolidation was a classic 
case of the rising power of big business, and its power to dictate 
working conditions had grown enormously since the early days 
of the Waterville shops.
By 1917 Maine Central Railroad had almost one hundred 
and fifty steam locomotives, more than three hundred pas­
senger, mail, and baggage cars, and over seven thousand freight 
cars.23 In addition to the principal shops in Waterville, the 
company operated a somewhat smaller set of shops at Thom p­
son’s Point, on the western edge of Portland, and had a very old 
shop for freight car repair at Turner’s Island in South Portland. 
Waterville, however, was the major shop location, where in a
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typical year 125 of the 149 locomotives [1917 roster] would be 
serviced and overhauled.
World War I found the Maine Central in much better 
shape than many other United States railroads, due to money 
invested by the Morgan interests when Maine Central was 
briefly within J. P Morgan’s New Haven Railroad empire. 
However, Waterville was subject to national wage and price 
trends in the months preceding the war that brought increasing 
bitterness in the railroad shops. As the national preparedness 
effort drove wages higher in shipbuilding and in m unitions 
factories, wages in the railroad industry failed to keep pace. 
Across the nation the issue was growing contentious.
America's entrance into World War I on April 6,1917, was 
marked by brief patriotic celebrations in the shops.24 Yet hardly 
a m onth after war began, the shops were swept by a strike over 
wages and union recognition. Back in January 1917 representa­
tives of the shop workers in Waterville who belonged to the 
American Federation of Railroad Workers requested a four cent 
an hour increase across the board for all shop workers. Maine 
Central officials had little or no interest in recognizing the 
American Federation of Railway Workers, and they delayed in 
formally meeting with them from January until the first week 
in May. Then on May 4, the company offered four cents an hour 
to the skilled men and one and a half cents an hour to unskilled 
and semiskilled workers, such as helpers. The offer was the 
same type of wage proposal that Maine Central would offer any 
A.F.L. craft union. No substantial progress was made over the 
weekend and up to Tuesday, May 8. Clearly the impasse was 
over the new union's demand for a single raise for all shop 
workers — a reflection of the inclusive bargaining strategy of 
the industrial union. The American Federation of Railroad 
Workers came down a cent to three cents an hour, but they 
indicated their determination to get an equal raise for all, as “ ... 
it costfs] the families of the unskilled just as much to live... ” as 
those who were skilled.25
As current labor historians have indicated, industrial 
management nationally during this period adopted a policy of
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dividing the labor movement by coopting and cooperating 
with craft unions, whose leaders had clearly committed them­
selves to economic advancement based upon recognition of 
craft skills.26 While it is probably too facile an explanation to 
see Maine Central management taking a stand entirely on the 
basis of these national patterns, what followed was almost a 
textbook example.
Maine Central’s final offer was four cents an hour for 
boilermakers, blacksmiths, and machinists, two cents an hour 
for carpenters, car repairers [carmen], and painters, and one 
and a half cents an hour to unskilled and semiskilled men, such 
as freight-yard nonoperating crews, helpers in the various 
trades, laborers, sweepers, watchmen, and wipers. The Ameri­
can Federation of Railroad Workers’ final position was for an 
across-the-board raise of three cents an hour. Failing to reach 
agreement, on May 9, at 9 a.m., all but the A.F.L. machinists 
and a few carmen belonging to the A.F.L. Brotherhood of 
Railway Carmen of America quietly put their tools away, 
formed ranks, and marched out of the shops.27
The strike continued for many weeks. During that time it 
gradually became clear to the public that the issue keeping 
nearly all workmen but A.F.L. machinists out of Waterville 
shops was not a penny or so difference in hourly rates, but a 
much more profound question of rival unionism — in this 
case, industrial versus craft unionism. Nationally the conserva­
tive A.F.L. railroad unions (machinists and carmen) were at 
odds with the more radical American Federation of Railroad 
Workers, who represented car workers, blacksmiths, boiler­
makers, inspectors, carmen, and carpenters, as well as painters, 
helpers, laborers, and watchmen. At Waterville, this rivalry 
would be played out in the dramatic events of the Maine Cen­
tral strike in the months to come, and it would resonate 
through the roundhouses in Rumford, Bangor, and Calais as 
well.28
The strikers had a good press in Waterville (which had a 
Democratic mayor and a police chief who was a former lead 
blacksmith in the shops), and they were described as behaving
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with much dignity. One workman was quoted as saying:
We have nothing against the Maine Central, nothing 
against the foremen. It is simply a walkout for better 
conditions for us all. I don’t think that there is a man 
who walked out today but what if there were a pas­
senger wreck would volunteer his services w ill­
ingly .... 29
Financial support for the strikers was immediate from 
Maine Central’s operating crews (represented by the “Big 
Four” brotherhoods — the Engineers, Firemen, Conductors, 
and Trainmen) who felt constrained to honor their contracts to 
run the trains, but still made substantial donations of money to 
the strikers. The Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, an A.F.L. 
union, also pledged its support for the strikers at their 
bimonthly meeting.30
Shippers on Maine Central felt the strike immediately, as 
an embargo was placed on all but essential freight by the 
railroad, in order to assure the maintenance of food supplies. At 
the end of May 1917 there were more than five hundred “Bad 
Order” cars sidetracked in the Waterville yard, and there were 
many more such cars on sidings all along the line due to hot 
boxes, pulled drawbars, and similar malfunctions.31 Strike­
breakers appeared in Waterville at the end of May, coming from 
Bangor by train directly to the shops and returning daily to that 
city fifty miles away.32
Waterville’s Chamber of Commerce, impressed not only 
by the local crisis but also by the wave of strikes across the 
nation in textiles, shoe manufacturing, meat packing, quarry­
ing, urban transit, and many other railroad shops, offered to 
help as conciliator between Maine Central and its striking shop 
workers. Even though Samuel Gompers, president of the 
A.F.L. had pledged officially that there would be no strikes for 
the duration of hostilities, there were actually 6,205 recorded 
strikes between April 6, 1917 and November 11, 1918.33 In the 
first days of June a committee to articulate the public’s interest 
in the local strike situation was formed, consisting of the city’s
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mayor, Ora A. Meader; the vice-president of the Chamber of 
Commerce, Frederick C. Hill; and Colby College’s president, 
Arthur J. Roberts.34
The strikers met daily to discuss their struggle. On May 31 
union organizer John Humphrey of Chicago, State Labor 
Commissioner Roscoe Eddy, and two members of the State 
Board of Arbitration and Conciliation met in Augusta for 
nearly five hours with no results. Two days later the strike 
leaders reached out for help from an unusual source: the 
Women’s Suffrage Movement. Urged by their leaders, the strik­
ers attended a public suffrage meeting on June 2. At the rally, 
Humphrey praised Deborah Knox Livingston, national super­
in tendent of the Suffrage D epartm ent of the W omen's 
Christian Temperance Union, for her fine address in favor of 
suffrage for women. He urged every striker to vote in favor of 
political equality for women.35 Instead of referring to the 
Augusta conference, Humphrey spent his time that Sunday 
afternoon attacking Frank Jennings, the American Federation 
of Labor organizer for the machinists. The A.F.L. shop- 
craftsmen, Humphrey pointed out, had obtained a closed shop 
contract from Maine Central two weeks before. The machinists 
won protection from nonunion workers and four cents an 
hour, while the six A.F.L. workers in Waterville gained only 
two and a half cents an hour. Humphrey dramatically con­
trasted these differential rates with the American Federation of 
Railroad Workers’ request for a three cent increase for every­
one, regardless of the degree of craft skill.36
James Dwyer, formerly a shop worker in the Boston and 
Albany Railroad shops in Boston, was the other organizer 
present at the Sunday suffrage meeting. Dwyer thanked Mayor 
Meader, Waterville Chief of Police Ernest Finnimore (a black­
smith on leave from Waterville shops), and the members of the 
Chamber of Commerce for their concern and assistance. He 
then directed his oratory to the Maine Central officials then 
serving as negotiators with the union. General Manager Dana 
C. Douglass, he informed the crowd, was better fitted to be a car 
cleaner than a manager. Douglass and Phillip F. Hammett,
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superintendent of motive power, were “dirty” and “unprin­
cipled.” As for Master Mechanic Fred Ramsdell, he was 
“nothing more than a stool pigeon.” Finally, above all else, he 
attacked the “scab” machinists with this revealing threat: “Mr. 
Highbrow machinists [sic], we are going to lick you and the 
railroad before we are through.”37
Clearly the real prizes in the struggle were union recogni­
tion and the closed shop. These two conditions would allow 
the machinists to use their shop committees to govern work 
rules for the machinists, helpers, and apprentices. Union 
recognition meant working agreements. Maine Central Rail­
road, on the other hand, was willing to contract with the 
established, more conservative A.F.L. machinist union, but the 
insurgent American Federation of Railroad Workers operated 
in the radical Eugene V. Debs tradition as an industrial union. 
The bitterness between the two unions — one industrial and 
the other craft — surfaced in a long, angry article published in 
the Waterville Sentinel attacking the A.F.L. machinist union.
Many [of the nonstriking machinists and car­
men] did not content themselves with minding their 
own business but instead ... several machinists and
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many members of the B.R.C. of A. [A.F.L. Brother­
hood of Railway Carmen of America] chose to try 
their hand at strike breaking by stooping to every 
unfair method imaginable to try and divide and force 
their fellow shop men back into the shops ....
We only contend that representing as we do a 
majority of the employees of the Locomotive and Car 
Dept, as well as all of the employees of the Maine 
Shop of the M. of W. [Maintenance of Way] Depart­
ment we are entitled to an agreement to govern the 
working conditions in the Department in which our 
members are employed.38
The strike continued for weeks. Under pressure from the 
Chamber of Commerce, Maine Central’s President Morris 
McDonald (concurrently president of the Boston fc Maine and 
Maine Central Railroads) entered the negotiations after June 
11. Up to that time the chief railroad negotiators had been 
Maine Central’s Dana Douglass and Philip Hammett. In spite 
of brief hope for an early settlement, the addition of the rail­
road’s president to the negotiations made little difference. 
Hammett informed the Chamber of Commerce that the strike 
was not really over wages, but about union recognition and 
“working agreements.” McDonald added that he could not 
break faith with the machinists and that the Maine Central’s 
final terms were: “The Shops to be opened and the men on 
strike to return without blacklists or lockout and after 12 
months to receive a working agreement.”39 While the union 
strikers remained away from their jobs, “scab” machinists con­
tinued to reach the shops from Boston, as well as from Bangor. 
The Boston scabs allegedly were available due to a strike in 
Boston against the Boston and Albany railroad. According to 
organizer Humphrey they were paid $5.00 a day (more than 
twice what many shop workers were paid) and given free board, 
clothing, and tobacco. They had a thirty-day contract with the 
Maine Central, and Waterville’s city government appointed 
numerous deputy sheriffs to protect them and the railroad’s 
property.40
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Convinced that they could do no more, the first special 
committee of the Chamber of Commerce disbanded in late 
June. The Chamber then appointed a new committee which 
called for more aggressive action by the state government to 
settle the strike.41 Meanwhile, Waterville’s newspaper carried 
reports of Maine Central train breakdowns, slowdowns, and, 
for the first time, violence when an explosion blew up a short 
piece of rail on the main line about a mile west of Waterville 
station. No one was injured and the strikers quickly disavowed 
any involvement in the incident.42
A few days later personal violence erupted between strikers 
and scabs. On July 17‘ Peter Gurney, one of the few local 
Waterville shopmen who had continued working, was attacked 
by strikers and his house was stoned. Gurney was a fifty-three- 
year-old painter who had worked for the railroad over 25 years. 
Almost at the same time, three strikers attacked two scabs on 
College Avenue only a few yards off the railroad’s property. 
The strikebreakers were part of a daily machinist contingent 
commuting from Bangor and Brewer. John Donahue, Walter 
Coady, and Albert Luce, arrested for assaulting the scabs, were 
out on bail minutes after their arraignment due to quick action 
by organizer Dwyer. On the following day in court two strikers 
were fined, Donahue being assessed a total of $30.00 in fines 
and $6.00 in costs while Luce owed $5.00 in fines and $6.00 in 
costs. Coady was found not guilty and discharged. The scabs 
left the court house, boarded a trolley, and rode back to the 
shops facing jeering women, while they sat in hum iliation 
under the protection of a “stout deputy sheriff.”43
The next few days were marked by occasional fist-fights 
and attacks on scabs and more fruitless meetings between strike 
leaders and State Labor Commissioner Eddy. In mid-July, the 
strikers learned that a settlement between Portland’s Cumber­
land Light and Power Company and its hundreds of trolley car 
motormen and conductors gave the latter ten percent wage 
increases. The agreement put those men into a new pay scale 
ranging from twenty-seven to thirty-three cents an hour.44 
Much closer to home, the Maine Central Railroad apparently
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found no difficulty in coming to an agreement with the 
A.F.L.’s International Association of Railway Clerks. On July 
19 the clerks requested an increase in wages and equal pay for 
equal work withou t regard to the sex of the workers. On August 
1 they received a raise of about three dollars a week. Assuming a 
standard fifty to fifty-five hour week, they had received a five or 
six cents an hour increase, more than the four cents given the 
machinists. Remarkably, the clerks had also obtained equal 
wages without regard to gender.45
How Maine Central was able to keep its trains rolling with 
its shops largely closed during the strike is something of a 
mystery, but a possible answer is found in a newspaper item 
that suggests extensive contacts between Maine Central’s 
locom otive inspector and the big locomotive shops in 
Schenectady, New York.46 Probably several of Maine Central’s 
locomotives were towed to the American Locomotive Works in 
Schenectady to receive “contract repairs” instead of normal 
shop work. The practice of using outside contractors for major
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locomotive repairs already had developed on other railroad 
lines and caused much labor uneasiness.
Finally, on August 7 the Maine State Board of Arbitration 
called a meeting with strikers and railroad officials. After sev­
eral days Maine Central’s Morris McDonald and the representa­
tives of the American Federation of Railroad Workers agreed to 
abide by the arbitrator's decisions and progress was swift 
toward ending the strike.47
Balloting on the arbitrator’s decision was held on August 
12 at Portland, Brunswick, Waterville, and Bangor. The Maine 
Central’s final offer was a two and a half cents to four cents an 
hour raise depending upon worker status, such as apprentice, 
helper, or journeyman. Seniority would continue to figure in 
wage rates, as it had before the strike.There would be no recog­
nition of the American Federation of Railroad Workers. The 
Maine Central did issue a statement that it might recognize the 
Railroad Workers in eight months when the A.F.L.’s Machi­
nists’ contract came up for renewal.48 No record of any such 
recognition has been found, however. The strikers agreed to 
this settlement, apparently without great bitterness, possibly 
because great demand for railroad equipment guaranteed 
everyone plenty of overtime pay. In any event the Waterville 
Sentinel reported the strikers’ final meeting as a kind of celebra­
tion, which closed with a unanimous vote of thanks to both 
John Humphrey and James Dwyer, the latter being sent on his 
way with a new and “handsome” black leather traveling bag.49
From the end of the strike in August 1917, through May 
1920, wages would rise steadily in the United States railroad 
industry. The na tion ’s railroads were nationalized on 
December 31, 1917 (officially at noon December 28, 1917, but 
the year-end date was chosen for accounting purposes) and one 
immediate result was much higher wages. These increases were 
distributed so that those at the lowest level of employment 
received the most, and those at the highest levels the least.50 
Ironically, this action was very similar to what the American 
Federation of Railroad Workers had advocated, in spite of the 
fact that the Railway Employees’ Department of the A.F.L. was
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recognized as the sole bargaining agent for railroad workers 
during the period of government control.51
The 1917 strike of the Waterville, Thom pson's Point, and 
Brunswick maintenance of way shops is an example of what 
American labor historian David Montgomery called a “direct 
challenge to managerial authority and contempt for accepted 
A.F.L. practice.”52 In common with other large strikes of the 
period it ended disastrously for the workers, who faced a deter­
mined, well-funded management and opposition from their 
fellow workers in the ranks of A.F.L. Such defeat, in this case in 
the face of rising wartime demand, was just a preview of what 
was to come in the 1920s when organized labor would expe­
rience steady reverses, in Maine as well as in the entire nation.
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